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Abstract
Unemployment is a critical life event that may affect the income trajectories of displaced workers very
unequally. It may lead to cumulative disadvantage and hit vulnerable groups hardest. Alternatively, it
may level the playing field because higher classes have more to lose. We analyse heterogeneous
effects of unemployment on income for the United Kingdom and Switzerland, using two household
panels—Understanding Society 2009–2017 and the Swiss Household Panel 1999–2017—and distin-
guishing two sources of income: from the labour market and welfare state, at the level of individuals
and households. We use a difference-in-differences design by matching unemployed to employed
workers and estimating fixed-effects regressions. Results show that individual labour income drops in
the 2 years after an unemployment spell by 20 and 25 per cent in Switzerland and by 25 and 55 per
cent in the United Kingdom. Welfare state transfers reduce these losses by half in Switzerland, but
have only a marginal impact in the United Kingdom. In both countries, income losses do not differ
much across social classes. If anything, they are smaller in the working class. We thus find no evi-
dence for cumulative disadvantage. The middle classes face a lower risk of becoming unemployed,
but are not less vulnerable to its consequences.
Introduction
Losing a job is a critical life event that may completely
alter an individual’s economic trajectory (DiPrete, 2002;
Gangl, 2006; Brandt and Hank, 2014). Yet as new jobs
are constantly created and old jobs destroyed, un-
employment may also constitute a purely transitory par-
enthesis in the careers of many workers (Farber, 1999;
Davis, Faberman and Haltiwanger, 2006). The large
spectrum of possible outcomes—from short-term bumps
to long-term scarring—raises the prospect that un-
employment affects the careers of population groups
very unequally. While workers in subordinate class posi-
tions may be particularly vulnerable to its consequences,
workers in more privileged class positions may bounce
back more easily to a job.
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Our paper examines whether the income consequen-
ces of an unemployment spell are stratified by individu-
als’ social class. We thus join a handful of longitudinal
studies in sociology that analyse heterogeneous effects of
unemployment on income (McManus and DiPrete,
2000; Ehlert, 2012, 2013; Grotti, 2016). Our analysis
combines the perspectives of the life course and social
stratification. Depending on how an individual’s mater-
ial resources and constraints—his or her own class pos-
ition—interact with a critical life event, unemployment
may have purely fleeting consequences or constitute a
crucial turning point in the career.
On this issue, the literature offers two conflicting
accounts. Unemployment may trigger a process of cu-
mulative disadvantage that hits vulnerable groups hard-
est, notably the working class (DiPrete and McManus,
2000). Or, on the contrary, an unemployment spell may
level the playing field because higher-earnings classes
have more to lose (Gangl, 2006). Rather than increasing
income inequality, an unemployment spell would then
reshuffle the cards across income groups.
The economic literature on job displacement typic-
ally focuses on the consequences of unemployment for
work income (see the overview in Couch and Placzek,
2010). However, people’s life chances do not only de-
pend on their success on the labour market. Two other
institutions potentially compensate the earnings losses
due to unemployment: the welfare state through social
benefits and the family through the household pooling
of resources (Esping-Andersen, 1999). A second contri-
bution of our analysis is to separate the incomes stem-
ming from the market (earnings) and the state (taxes
and transfers). By further distinguishing income flows
at the individual and household level, we show how the
income pooling within households buffers workers
against economic insecurity during periods of
unemployment.
The extent to which different institutions provide an
income during an unemployment spell is likely to vary
across countries. The classical comparison in the litera-
ture is between Germany and the United States (e. g.
McManus and DiPrete, 2000; Gangl, 2004; Ehlert,
2012; Grotti, 2016). Our study focuses on a different
contrast and compares the income effect of unemploy-
ment between Britain and Switzerland. While
Switzerland has an occupational labour market with
strong links between vocational education and employ-
ment, the United Kingdom comes closer to an internal
labour market where general education and on-the-job
training dominate (Marsden, 1990). In addition, their
welfare states were inspired by different architects:
Beveridge and minimum income schemes are central for
Britain, Bismarck, and status-conserving social insuran-
ces for Switzerland (Bonoli, 1997).
When analysing the income effect of unemployment, a
central concern is selection bias and thus the presence of
characteristics that affect both workers’ risk of becoming
unemployed and their subsequent incomes (Brand, 2015:
p. 362). We address this concern with a difference-in-
differences design. The idea is to combine an individual-
level fixed-effects model with a matching method that pro-
vides us with a control group of workers who are similar,
but did not become unemployed. We examine the evolu-
tion of income 2 years before and 3 years after the begin-
ning of an unemployment spell on the basis of two
household panels: Understanding Society 2009–2017 for
the United Kingdom and the Swiss Household Panel
(SHP) 1999–2017 for Switzerland.
In what follows, our theory section presents the idea
of heterogeneous effects of unemployment on income
and discusses the three institutions that provide individ-
uals with an income: the market, state, and family. Our
data and methods section introduces the household pan-
els and outlines the advantage of combining a matching
method with a fixed-effects regression. Our results then
show overall income loss after unemployment in the
United Kingdom and Switzerland and disaggregate these
losses for work and government income, at the individ-
ual and the household level, and for different social
classes. The conclusion summarizes the results and out-
lines their implications for the concept of cumulative
disadvantage.
Stratified Effects of Unemployment on
Income
There is ample evidence that workers in lower-class
positions face greater risks of becoming unemployed
than workers in the upper-middle class (Goldthorpe and
McKnight, 2006; Oesch, 2010; OECD, 2013: p. 34).
However, being at greater risk of experiencing an event
does not automatically translate into larger vulnerability
to its consequences. Unemployment may set in motion
two different mechanisms. It may activate a process of
cumulative disadvantage where the financial hardship of
less advantaged groups further increases over time
(DiPrete and Eirich, 2006). Alternatively, it may initiate
a process of regression to the mean where social classes
at the top fall from greater heights than classes at the
bottom whose income is cushioned by the welfare state’s
floor effect.
These processes lead to two opposing predictions.
On the one hand, workers in higher-class positions earn
higher wages and have more to lose from
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unemployment—in relative and, above all, absolute
terms—than workers in subordinate positions whose
market earnings may not be far from the minimum level
of social benefits. On the other hand, workers in higher-
class positions also possess more resources to cope with
unemployment. They tend to be part of social networks
that provide more information and influence on job
vacancies (Oesch and von Ow, 2017) and they tend to
be better off financially, with larger unemployment ben-
efits and personal savings, which may allow them to
hold out longer until they find an adequate job
(Schmelzer, 2011).
Unemployment often leads to earnings losses because
job- and firm-specific skills devaluate when workers
have to change employer. While access to the profes-
sions and management often requires higher education
and thus a form of credentialed general skills, the work-
ing class may depend more strongly on job- and firm-
specific human capital. These specific skills may transfer
less easily from one job and firm to another than general
educational credentials (Schmelzer, 2011). As a conse-
quence, the upper-middle class may fare better than the
working class after a spell of unemployment.
However, the literature does not provide a clear-cut
answer as to whether regression to the mean or cumulative
advantage prevails. While several longitudinal studies find
that high-income workers lose, in relative terms, more
after an unemployment spell than low-income workers in
Britain (Gregory and Jukes, 2001), Germany (Burda and
Mertens, 2001) as well as in Germany and the United
States (DiPrete and McManus, 2000; Gangl, 2006), more
recent evidence suggests that unemployment has the most
severe effect on the poorest quintile in the United States
and the middle quintile in Germany (Ehlert, 2013).
The two countervailing mechanisms may cancel each
other out. Yet, our expectation is that having more
resources to cope with unemployment trumps the risk of
falling from a greater height that comes with a better
paying pre-displacement job. Therefore, our first hy-
pothesis deems a process of cumulative disadvantage to
be the more likely outcome:
H1: After an unemployment spell, the labour income of
workers in higher class positions will recover more
quickly than those of workers in lower class positions.
The Institutions Compensating for Income
Loss
Labour Markets
Unemployment heightens economic insecurity because
earnings from labour constitute the main source of in-
come for most households. Yet the degree to which an
unemployment spell effectively translates into economic
hardship may vary across countries. Labour market
institutions affect both the time it takes for unemployed
workers to find a new job and the income levels associ-
ated with the new job (Gangl, 2006).
While our two-country comparison dissuades us
from entering the large debate on the institutional em-
beddedness of labour markets, one concept seems help-
ful for the purpose of our study: the distinction between
occupational and internal labour markets (Marsden,
1990; Ehlert, 2013: p. 88). Countries such as Germany
or Switzerland are dominated by an occupational labour
market with strong links between education, notably the
apprenticeship system, and employment. Vocational
degrees certify the skills that are required for specific
occupations and provide clear signals to employers
about workers’ qualifications. In contrast, countries
such as Britain or the United States come closer to in-
ternal labour markets where general education and on-
the-job training dominate and vocational skills are often
acquired through work experience and are specific to
single firms (Schmelzer, 2011). To the extent that voca-
tional skills apply to an entire occupation rather than a
single firm and are nationally credentialed (and thus
widely recognized by employers), human capital may be
more easily portable from one employer to another in
the German-speaking countries than in the United
Kingdom or United States (Bol and Van de Werfhorst,
2013; Korber, 2019). As a result, our second hypothesis
expects earnings losses to be smaller in Switzerland’s oc-
cupational than in the United Kingdom’s internal labour
market:
H2: An unemployment spell should be associated with
smaller losses in work income in Switzerland than
Britain.
Welfare States and the Household
The economic literature on job displacement mostly
focuses on how unemployment affects labour market
earnings (see the overview in Couch and Placzek, 2010).
However, the extent to which job loss entails economic
insecurity and hampers life chances does not only de-
pend on the labour market. Two more institutions cru-
cially contribute to social security: the state and the
family (Esping-Andersen, 1999; DiPrete, 2002).
Welfare states provide financial transfers and in-kind
services and thus offer a critical safety net for the un-
employed. Unemployment benefits serve as automatic
stabilizers of income at both the macro-level of the econ-
omy and the micro-level of individuals. Yet, the extent
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to which welfare states reduce individuals’ dependence
on the labour market—the extent of decommodifica-
tion—varies across countries and, within single coun-
tries, between population groups (Esping-Andersen,
1990; DiPrete and McManus, 2000: p. 346; Ehlert,
2013: p. 89).
When a slack labour market hampers reemployment
and welfare benefits are both modest and short-termed,
the family provides a last coping strategy. By pooling
resources among household members, families may
cushion the consequences of an earnings loss. For eco-
nomic well-being, the evolution of household income is
at least as consequential as individual earnings because
the household is the decisive unit of consumption for
most people, most clearly so in terms of food and
accommodation.
Of course, the three institutional sources of income
interact. If the labour market is dynamic and finding a
job straightforward, the welfare state does not have to
provide a replacement income for long and the house-
hold does not have to jump in. While the family is a core
provider of social security across the Western world, it is
particularly important in countries and periods where
good jobs are few and government benefits meagre. The
typical example is the family-based welfare regime of
Southern Europe (Esping-Andersen, 1999). Yet, Ehlert
(2012) finds that also unemployed men in the United
States strongly rely on household resources to maintain
their income, notably in comparison with unemployed
men in Germany who, in turn, obtain greater support
from the welfare state.
The Welfare Buffer at the Individual and
Household Level
Our study’s focus is on identifying how the market
(through work income) and state (through social bene-
fits) moderate the economic insecurity induced by un-
employment for different social classes. While we do not
analyse the role of the family directly, we calculate in-
come losses both at the individual and household level.
This informs us on the extent to which the pooling of
work income in households—and thus typically among
family members—compensates for individuals’ loss of
earnings. More interestingly, this further allows us to
separate the contribution of the welfare state at the indi-
vidual and household level and thus to distinguish an in-
dividual welfare buffer from a household welfare buffer.
Unemployment benefits accrue at the individual
level. Our study contrasts Britain with Switzerland and
compares two unemployment benefit schemes moulded
by the different logics of Beveridge and Bismarck
(Bonoli, 1997). In Switzerland’s corporatist welfare
state, unemployment insurance pays out benefits that
are proportional to pre-displacement earnings and thus
conserve status differences among unemployed individu-
als. Benefit entitlement is comparatively long (18–
24 months after job loss), replacement rates are high
(70–80 per cent of the pre-unemployment wage), and
only capped at almost twice the national median wage.
In contrast, Britain’s liberal welfare state hands out un-
employment insurance for only 6 months and benefits
are basically flat rate. Unemployed individuals depend
to a greater extent on means-tested benefits such as the
jobseeker allowance.
While individuals are the recipients of unemployment
compensation, several other means-tested government
benefits target the household (Immervoll and
Richardson, 2011). In both corporatist and liberal wel-
fare states, the objective of a minimum income is mainly
pursued at the household level and involves general so-
cial assistance schemes as well as housing benefits, child
benefits, and refundable tax credits (Nelson, 2013).
While social assistance is comparatively generous in
Switzerland, housing supplements and exemptions from
health costs and local taxes help to stabilize the house-
hold income of jobless workers in the United Kingdom
(Clasen, 2011: pp. 21–22).
The welfare buffer is likely to be more redistributive
at the household than the individual level. This is not-
ably the case in corporatist welfare states where
contribution-based unemployment insurance pays out
benefits that are roughly proportional to individuals’
work income and thus translates labour market inequal-
ities into social policy. By contrast, social transfers at
the household level tend to be means-tested (with the ex-
ception of child benefits) and therefore benefit poorer
households to a larger extent. These arguments suggest
that the welfare buffer should reduce the income gap be-
tween social classes more at the household than the indi-
vidual level in both countries—but particularly so in
Switzerland.
Results from Earlier Studies
Available evidence suggests that individuals’ income
losses after an unemployment spell are surprisingly simi-
lar across countries. An analysis of the British
Household Panel (BHPS) finds that unemployment
causes a short-term loss in income of nearly 40 per cent
and a long-term loss of 10 per cent (Upward and
Wright, 2017: p. 24). These results for Britain are com-
parable to losses found for the United States (Couch and
Placzek, 2010) and Germany (Vossemer, 2019: p. 8)
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where unemployment is associated with an income fall
at the individual level of 40 per cent in the first year and
15 per cent after 5 years.
Income losses in Britain do not seem to be mitigated
much by welfare benefits (Upward and Wright, 2017).
In this respect, the British results contrast with findings
from Nordic countries, notably Norway where un-
employment leads to smaller income losses at the house-
hold level because the drop in earnings from work is
compensated by public transfers (Hardoy and Schøne,
2014). Similarly, in the case of unemployment, the wel-
fare state provides a larger replacement income at the
household level in Germany than in the United States
(McManus and DiPrete, 2000: p. 429; Ehlert, 2012).
For our country comparison, this suggests that
Switzerland’s higher unemployment beneits at the indi-
vidual level and more generous social assistance scheme
at the household level should reduce income losses more
than in Britain. This leads us to formulate our third
hypothesis:
H3: Government taxes and transfers compensate the
loss of work income due to unemployment to a greater
extent in Switzerland than in Britain, both at the individ-
ual and household level.
Data and Measures
Our analysis is based on the SHP 1999–2017 and the
UK Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS) 2009–
2017, also known as Understanding Society. Given that
the SHP has a much smaller sample, we take into ac-
count a longer period for Switzerland than the United
Kingdom. Although the period under study for the
United Kingdom coincides with the post-recession years,
the unemployment rate was only marginally higher in
the decade after than before the Great Recession: 3.9 per
cent over the period 1999–2008 as compared to an aver-
age of 4.5 per cent for 2009–2018. In Switzerland, the
unemployment rate increased from 3 per cent in 1999–
2008 to 4.2 per cent in 2009–2018 and thus reached a
similar level as in the United Kingdom.1
For both countries, we use all members of the origin-
al sample aged 24–62 years who reported full interview
outcomes: 4,564 individuals and 48,363 person-years in
Switzerland, 35,715 individuals and 395,354 person-
years in the United Kingdom. Attrition in SHP is com-
parable with other household panel surveys such as
BHPS or Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), with
about 65 per cent of original respondents remaining
after five waves (Voorpostel et al., 2014). Two
refreshment samples compensate for the loss of partici-
pants. In UKHLS, 52 per cent of the initial respondents
were still participating 6 years after the beginning (Lynn
and Borkowska, 2018). While attrition is particularly
high in the age group 16–19, they are too young to be
part of our analytical sample.2
Our dependent variable is the logarithm of income,
measured with four different income concepts. (i)
Individual labour income includes wages from primary
and secondary jobs, but not from self-employment. (ii)
Individual post-government labour income adds social
security transfers, but subtracts taxes. (iii) Pre-govern-
ment household income captures the pooling of income
among household members. (iv) Post-government
household income adds social benefits and subtracts
taxes at the household level. For years when individuals
do not have any earnings, we follow previous studies
and assign a value of zero income (e.g. Ehlert, 2013;
OECD, 2013; Vossemer, 2019).3 Household incomes
are adjusted for household size based on the OECD
equivalence scale: the respondent is assigned a weight of
1, other adults are given a weight of 0.5 and children of
0.3. All incomes are deflated with the consumer price
index.4
The key independent variable is a spell of self-
reported unemployment that lasts at least one month
after at least 2 months of continuous employment with
positive wages.5 Our treatment thus measures whether
individuals experience an episode of unemployment
after having been in employment, the focus being on
transitions from employment to unemployment as in
Ehlert (2013). Contrary to plant closure (Brand, 2015),
our measure of unemployment is not an exogenous
treatment. We try to address this issue by combining a
matching method with fixed-effects (see below), but un-
observed heterogeneity may still affect the unemploy-
ment risk and income trajectories.
For our analysis of heterogeneous effects, we stratify
our sample by social class. We use a merged version of
the scheme developed by Oesch (2006) and distinguish
three employee classes: (i) the upper-middle class of
managers and professionals; (ii) the lower-middle class
of associate managers, semi-professionals, technicians,
and skilled clerks; (iii) the working class of craft, pro-
duction, sales, and service workers. These three catego-
ries closely echo the distinction made by Erikson and
Goldthorpe (1992: p. 36) between the service relation-
ship for occupations at the top, intermediate occupa-
tions and the labour contract for working-class
occupations at the bottom. We allocate wage-earners
into one of the three classes based on detailed occupa-
tional information (at the level of ISCO four-digit).
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Our analytical strategy tries to approach a causal design
by explicitly addressing selection into unemployment.
We thus compare individuals who experience unemploy-
ment (treatment group) with individuals who share simi-
lar socio-demographic characteristics and thus similar
risks of becoming unemployed, but who do remain con-
tinuously employed throughout the period under study
(control group).
As the control and treatment groups differ in charac-
teristics that are relevant for both their risk of becoming
unemployed and their income, we make them compar-
able with a matching approach that uses pre-
displacement characteristics. For each individual who
eventually becomes unemployed (in the treatment
group), we look for one or more individuals who will
not experience unemployment (in the control group),
but who was the most similar to the individual in the
treatment group based on the observable characteristics
2 years before the onset of unemployment.
We use the method of coarsened exact matching
(CEM, Iacus, King and Porro, 2011) which involves
three steps.6 First, we temporarily coarsen control varia-
bles that may confound the influence of an unemploy-
ment spell on income by transforming them into
categories. As an example, age was coarsened into three
subgroups. Second, we sort all units into strata, each of
which has the same values on the coarsened variables.
Third, we prune from the dataset the units in any stra-
tum that do not include at least one treated and one con-
trol unit. The covariates used for matching are inspired
by previous works (Ehlert, 2012, 2013; Voßmer, 2019)
and include demographic characteristics (age, gender,
having British or Swiss citizenship, respectively), educa-
tion (ISCED 0–2, 3–4, 5–6), number of hours worked,
self-perceived health (four categories), and firm size
(four categories). We do not use the three social classes
for matching, but run our model for each of class in
order to examine the presence of heterogeneous effects.
Individuals in the control and treatment group are
matched in the same survey year so that both groups are
exposed to the same business cycle. The year used for
matching precedes the unemployment spell of the treat-
ment group by 2 years and allows us to compare the in-
come evolution of the two groups over the subsequent
waves.
Our design uses a difference-in-differences model
and is thus based on the assumption of parallel trends—
that is, that in the absence of an unemployment spell,
the incomes of treatment and control groups would have
evolved in parallel. Supplementary Figures S3 and S4
suggest that this assumption is plausible for both coun-
tries, the income trends being very similar during the 5
years preceding an unemployment spell.
Supplementary Tables S2–S4 show the descriptive
statistics of the treatment and control group. For a num-
ber of individuals in the treatment group, there was no
comparable individual in the control group (i.e., the
CEM algorithm did not find any matching between the
two groups). These observations were deleted from the
analysis.7
Regression Model
We combine our matching method with a fixed-effects
panel model to estimate the effect of unemployment on
income (Halaby, 2004). The fixed-effects estimator only
uses the within-variance stemming from changes in
workers’ lives over time. This eliminates all observed
and unobserved characteristics of the individual that are
time-constant such as personality and abilities which
may affect both the likelihood to become unemployed
and the evolution of income.8 Our model is based on the
following equation:






ckUjTk þ Xjt þ tjt;
where Yjt is the income for person (or household) j at
time t. Tk indicates the yearly time dummies for the kth
relative to the reference year, and bk represents the asso-
ciated coefficients and shows the income growth for the
control group. Uj is a binary measure for workers expe-
riencing an unemployment spell and is interacted with
the time dummies Tk. Therefore, the coefficient ck cap-
tures the income loss of the unemployed. Xjt additional-
ly controls for time-varying socio-demographic
characteristics such as age, presence of a partner, chil-
dren, and survey years (aggregated into multi-year
groups). aj is the individual fixed effect, while tjt cap-
tures idiosyncratic errors. We use clustered standard
errors at the individual level because the observations
are not independent over time. Since log changes are
only equal to percentage differences for small quantities,
we show all our results in percentages by converting log
points into percentage points.
Income Losses of the Entire Workforce
We begin our analysis by focusing on income loss for the
entire sample. Figure 1 shows that an unemployment
spell in the United Kingdom leads to a total loss of indi-
vidual labour income of more than 55 per cent in the
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year of unemployment (see Table A1 in the Appendix A
for the coefficients). In the subsequent 2 years, the losses
decrease to 29 and 25 per cent of pre-unemployment
earnings. State transfers in the United Kingdom are sur-
prisingly ineffective as they reduce income losses at the
individual level by no more than 8 percentage points.
At the household level, losses in pre-government in-
come are more limited as they fall by about 23 per cent
in the first year of unemployment and by about 15 and
10 per cent in the two following years. The pooling of
income from several members means that a given loss at
the individual level makes up a smaller part of total
household income. Still, the impact of state transfers in
the United Kingdom is also modest at the household
level. Factoring in government benefits reduces the in-
come losses only by a few percentage points.
Figure 2 shows for Switzerland that workers lose on
average 20 per cent of their pre-government labour in-
come in the year when unemployment takes place. The
loss then further increases to 22 per cent in the second
year (see Table A2 for the coefficients).9 Labour incomes
recover 2 years later when losses decrease to about 15
per cent. Compared to the United Kingdom, state bene-
fits are much more consequential in Switzerland. Once
government transfers and taxes are added on, income
losses are halved. At the individual level, post-
government income losses range between 8 and 13 per
cent in the 3 years that follow the beginning of an un-
employment spell. Income losses at the household level
are almost divided by two in comparison to individual
income losses. If we further account for state transfers
and taxes at the household level, an unemployment spell
leads to income losses of no more than annually 10 per
cent.
In Table 1, we provide summary measures that disen-
tangle the contribution of income from different sour-
ces.10 Column 1 shows the importance of the individual
welfare buffer: the extent to which post-unemployment
income losses are reduced by state transfers and taxes at
the individual level. Column 2 reveals the contribution
of the household welfare buffer: the extent to which in-
come losses are further moderated by state transfers and
taxes at the household level. This overview suggests that
welfare state transfers are much more effective in
Switzerland. In the first and second year after an un-
employment spell, they reduce income losses by 8–14
percentage points at the individual level and by 5–11
percentage points at the household level. In the United
Figure 1. Changes in income after an unemployment spell in the United Kingdom (in per cent)
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Kingdom, the impact of state transfers is weak at the
level both of individuals (where it compensates for no
more than 4–8 percentage points) and of households
(where it compensates for no more than 2–3 percentage
points of the income losses). In both countries, the wel-
fare buffer is larger at the individual than the household
level. However, this is partly due to the fact that actual
income losses are also larger at the individual than the
household level (see Figures 1 and 2 above). If actual
losses were zero, the welfare buffer would be, by defin-
ition, zero as well.
Income Losses by Social Class
We turn to the analysis of heterogeneous treatment
effects and show in and 4 how unemployment affects
Figure 2. Changes in income after an unemployment spell in Switzerland (in per cent)
Table 1. The extent to which state transfers and taxes reduce the income loss after an unemployment spell (in percentage
points)
(1) Individual welfare buffer: (2) Household welfare buffer:










Notes: Reading example: in the UK, state transfers and taxes reduce the income loss in the year of unemployment by 8 percentage points at the individual level and
by 2 percentage points at the household level. For the formula, see footnote 10.
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earnings for each of the three social classes (for the coef-
ficients, see Supplementary Tables S5–S10). In Britain,
earnings losses are larger in the upper-middle than in the
working class, amounting to about 64 per cent in T0 and
37 per cent T1 in the upper-middle class as compared to
45 and 23 per cent for the working class (see ). Again,
income losses are halved at the household level, when
taking into account the pooling of income among several
people. State transfers do not make much of a difference
in the United Kingdom, reducing income losses by about
10 percentage points. However, they appear most conse-
quential for the working class, both at the individual
and household level. Once we take into account state
transfers and taxes, income losses in working-class
households fall below 10 per cent 1 and 2 years after the
onset of an unemployment spell. For the United
Kingdom, these results run contrary to the hypothesis
that unemployment leads to a process of cumulative dis-
advantage as working-class individuals and households
actually suffer smaller income losses than incumbents of
the lower- and upper-middle class.
Figure 3 Changes in income after an unemployment
spell by social class in the United Kingdom (in per cent)
Figure 3.
In Switzerland, there are no clear differences in in-
come losses across social classes (Figure 4). At the indi-
vidual level, pre- and post-government income losses are
larger for the lower-middle class than for either the
upper-middle or the working class. While this also seems
to be the case at the household level, recovery is particu-
larly strong for the working class where income losses
after an unemployment spell appear marginal. As for the
United Kingdom, this figure contradicts our hypothesis
of cumulative disadvantage and larger relative income
losses of the working class than the upper or lower mid-
dle class.
Table 2 shows again how the welfare state reduces
income losses for the three classes at the individual and
household level. In the United Kingdom, the government
benefits at the individual level reduce income losses
more for the upper-middle and, above all, lower-middle
class than the working class when looking at the
Figure 3. Figure 3. Change in income after an unemployment spell by social class in the UK (in per cent)
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individual level. This changes, however, at the level of
the household where state transfers and taxes are more
consequential as an income stabilizer for the working
class than either the lower-middle or upper-middle
classes. For the lower-middle and even more the upper-
middle class, taxes paid and transfers received seem to
cancel each other out. This result confirms the expect-
ation that in the United Kingdom the welfare buffer is
more redistributive at the household level than the indi-
vidual level, given that supplements paid out at the
Figure 4. Changes in income after an unemployment spell by class in Switzerland (in per cent)
Table 2. The extent to which state transfers and taxes reduce the income loss after an unemployment spell for different so-
cial classes (in percentage points)
(1) Individual welfare buffer: (2) Household welfare buffer:
Post-government minus pre-government individual labour income Post-government minus pre-government household income
Upper-middle Lower-middle Working class Upper-middle Lower-middle Working class
UK
T0 0.07 0.10 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.02
T1 0.09 0.11 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.06
T2 0.07 0.13 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.03
Switzerland
T0 0.07 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.03
T1 0.15 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.06
T2 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.00 0.11 0.02
Notes: Reading example: in the UK, state transfers and taxes reduce the income loss in the year of unemployment by 8 percentage points at the individual level and
by 2 percentage points at the household level. For the formula, see footnote 10.
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household level such as housing benefits, exemption
from health costs, and tax credits are means-tested and
thus benefit working-class families more than middle-
class families.
In Switzerland, the welfare state does not only pro-
vide a stronger buffer than in the United Kingdom, but
its effect is also much more even across social classes.
This is not surprising for the individual level where the
corporatist logic of its welfare state led us to expect that
the social insurance system transposes income differen-
ces from the labour market to unemployment. Yet con-
trary to our expectation, the working class does not
benefit to a greater extent from government transfers
than the middle-class at the household level (which is, of
course, partly due to the fact that working-class house-
holds experienced a smaller income drop to begin with,
see Figure 4 above). Given the extent of variance over
the years and across classes, the safest conclusion is that
the three classes in Switzerland benefit to a similar ex-
tent from state transfers after an unemployment spell.
Discussion
A central question raised by our paper is whether the in-
come losses after an unemployment spell vary across so-
cial classes. Contrary to our expectation, the empirical
evidence does not provide much support for the existence
of heterogeneous treatment effects. Our first hypothesis
expected people in advantageous class positions to fare
better in both countries. Yet our results indicate that in-
come losses experienced by the working class are not
larger than those of the lower and upper-middle class. If
anything, the working class seems to bear lower losses in
post-government household incomes in both countries
than the lower-middle and upper-middle class. This may
be the consequence of a floor effect as the incomes at the
bottom of the class structure fall from a lower level—and
the extent of this fall is further limited by minimum bene-
fit levels. It may also be due to the redistributive character
of means-tested social transfers at the household level as
well as to progressive tax rates that lead to higher taxation
for couples in the upper-middle than the working class.
Note, however, that even if we solely focus on labour in-
come, the working class does not show larger losses after
an unemployment spell than the lower or upper-middle
class in the United Kingdom or Switzerland.
These results should not be misinterpreted as signify-
ing that unemployment is not a critical life event. It
clearly is as individual labour income drops in the first 2
years after an unemployment spell by 20 and 22 per cent
in Switzerland and by 55 and 25 per cent in Britain—a
drop that is comparable across classes.
As expected, an episode of unemployment leads to
substantially lower earnings losses in Switzerland’s oc-
cupational labour market than in Britain’s internal la-
bour market, where skill transferability across firms
appears to be more limited. This difference may, how-
ever, also be due to the unemployment rate being slight-
ly lower in Switzerland than in the United Kingdom over
the period of analysis, making it easier for the un-
employed to get hired in jobs that are comparable to
their pre-unemployment positions. Additionally, it may
be linked to lower overall earnings inequality in
Switzerland which limits the extent of downwards shifts
in the income structure to a greater extent than in the
United Kingdom (OECD, 2016).
Unemployed workers in Switzerland do not only suf-
fer lower losses in labour income, they also benefit more
from the welfare state than is the case for the unemployed
in the United Kingdom. Consistent with our third hypoth-
esis, state transfers reduce income losses to a much larger
extent in Switzerland than in the United Kingdom, both
at the individual and household level. In the United
Kingdom, government transfers make a surprisingly
weak contribution to stabilizing the income of the un-
employed. While working-class families benefit from a
small welfare buffer at the household level, the tax and
transfer system seems ineffective in reducing the losses of
household income among the lower- and upper-middle
class. This leaves unemployed employees with basically
two options: to either return as quickly as possible to the
labour market or to rely on the support of other house-
hold members. The pooling of income within households
thus plays a larger role for income buffering in the United
Kingdom than in Switzerland—a finding that echoes the
result that unemployed men in the United States depend
more strongly on members of their household than un-
employed men in Germany who benefit from more gener-
ous state transfers (Ehlert, 2012).
Conclusion
Our findings provide little evidence for heterogeneous
income effects of unemployment on social classes. How
much confidence can we place in this result? We apply a
difference-in-differences design to panel data from two
countries and combine fixed-effects regressions with a
matching method. Still, our design only approximates a
causal inference design because unemployment spells
may not be exogenous to the evolution of income. This
is the case if the same unobserved (and time-changing)
characteristics increase the likelihood of becoming un-
employed and experiencing earnings losses.
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This caveat needs to be taken seriously. At the same
time, researchers seem more likely to mistake an effect
that is actually homogeneous as being heterogeneous.
This argument is made by Breen, Choi and Holm (2015)
who show that unobserved selection into the treatment
group (unemployment in our case, college education in
their study) increases the risk of erroneously finding het-
erogeneous causal effects (income differences across
classes in our case, income differences across socio-
economic groups in their study). To the extent that our
analysis shows small differences in income losses across
social classes, the safest bet is to conclude that there is
not much causal heterogeneity.
The widely varying results reported in the litera-
ture—with larger income losses found for high-income
households in some studies, but for low- or mid-income
household in other studies—also suggest that there may
be no systematic stratification of income losses after a
spell of unemployment. This finding implies that the
greater risk of becoming unemployed of lower classes
does not automatically translate into greater vulnerabil-
ity to its consequences once they are unemployed. At
least for the United Kingdom and Switzerland over the
last decade, our panel data provide no evidence that un-
employed workers are subject to this mechanism of cu-
mulative disadvantage. This is interesting as sociologists
often take processes of cumulative disadvantage for
granted, the poor becoming poorer and the rich becom-
ing richer. However, our study suggests that this is not
always empirically warranted.
Of course, an income loss of 20 per cent may be
much more hurtful for people who had very low earn-
ings to begin with than for individuals who earned com-
fortable wages before becoming unemployed. Notably,
an identical income drop of 20 per cent may have very
different consequences for economic deprivation in the
upper-middle than the working class if the incomes of
the latter are pushed below the poverty line. Seen in this
perspective, unemployment spells are not only more fre-
quent in the work careers of lower classes, but may also
be more disruptive.
At the same time, if we measured income changes in
absolute terms (and thus in Pound Sterling and Swiss
Francs) rather than in relative terms (using logged in-
come), a relative income loss of 20 per cent would show
up as a substantially larger absolute fall in the incomes
of the upper-middle than the working class. Based on
absolute income measures, our results would clearly
lead us to reject the hypothesis that income losses after
an unemployment spell are smaller for individuals from
more advantageous social classes.
While there may be disagreement on what our results
mean for cumulative disadvantages, what is undisputable
are the large country differences in how unemployed
workers are buffered against falling incomes. The Swiss
welfare state reduces the incomes losses after an unemploy-
ment spell by half, whereas the British welfare state pro-
vides minimal protection. In this sense, unemployment in
the United Kingdom is a critical life event for which insti-
tutions offer little help and which exposes individuals
across the class distribution to great economic insecurity.
Supplementary Data
Supplementary data are available at ESR online.
Notes
1 Data extracted from OECD stat (https://stats.oecd.
org/).
2 Following Upward and Wright (2017) and
Vossemer (2019), we examine attrition over time
and show that the level of unit non-response is very
similar for the treatment and control group (see
Supplementary Table S1).
3 In order to be able to calculate log income for spells
with 0 income, we attribute an income of 1 to these
spells.
4 In the activity calendar of the SHP, individuals report
their employment status on a monthly basis and their
income on an annual basis. In UKHLS, personal
questionnaires reconstruct the work activity of
respondents at the time of the interview as well as
any labour market spell that began after the inter-
view of the previous year. Both income and un-
employment are reported on a monthly basis. We
resolve any timing incongruence by assigning an un-
employment spell to the first year of unemployment.
5 Supplementary Figures S3 and S4 show the length
of unemployment spells in the two countries. We
run robustness checks with self-reported unemploy-
ment spells that last (i) at least 2 months or (ii) at
least 6 months and show these results in
Supplementary Figures S5–S9.
6 We examine the robustness of our findings by using
other matching methods, such as propensity score
matching with different algorithms (radius and
nearest neighbour) and specifications (different cal-
liper values). Results remain unchanged and are
available from the authors.
7 Note that the total number of unemployment epi-
sodes is larger than the number of individuals
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losing at least once their jobs because some individ-
uals experienced several unemployment spells.
Following Ehlert (2013), we therefore constructed
a data set consisting of 5-year episodes—two before
and three after the beginning of each unemploy-
ment spell. If a person became unemployed twice,
there will be two (possibly overlapping) episodes.
Episodes of unemployment are thus nested within
individuals.
8 A panel fixed-effects model without matching would
control for time-invariant unobserved variables of
the individuals who experience unemployment, but it
would not address the systematic difference of people
who experience unemployment and people who do
not experience unemployment. The results of the
fixed-effects models without matching are shown in
the web-appendix (see Supplementary Tables S11
and S12). They lead to the same substantial conclu-
sions as the model using matching.
9 Our results show larger income losses for T1 than T0
because of the structure of Switzerland’s panel data:
the collection of information on income does not
refer to the ongoing calendar year (income reported
in year t might refer to the period September t1 –
September t), but unemployment histories are
synchronized with the calendar year.
10 Following DiPrete and McManus (2000) and, above
all, Ehlert (2013: 96), we calculate the contribution
of state transfers and taxes as the difference between
pre-government individual labour income and post-
government individual labour income:
^
Welfare state effect ðindividualÞ ¼ d̂LIG  d̂LI;
where d̂
X
represents the estimated coefficients of
pre-government individual labour income changes
(LI) and post-government individual income
(LIG). At the household level, we calculate the
contribution of state transfers and taxes as the dif-
ference between pre-government and post-
government household income.
^
Welfare state effect ðhouseholdÞ ¼ d̂PostG  d̂PreG:
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Table A1. Post-matching fixed-effects panel regressions on log income, UK 2009–2017






T1 0.01** 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.00***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
T0 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00 0.00***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
T1 0.00 0.00 0.01*** 0.00*
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
T2 0.00* 0.00* 0.01*** 0.01***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
T2*U 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.045) (0.036) (0.035) (0.032)
T0*U 0.82*** 0.66*** 0.25*** 0.24***
(0.037) (0.024) (0.015) (0.013)
T1*U 0.35*** 0.28*** 0.16*** 0.13***
(0.031) (0.021) (0.016) (0.014)
T2*U 0.30*** 0.21*** 0.15*** 0.13***
(0.032) (0.022) (0.019) (0.017)
Age 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.08*** 0.08***
(0.013) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009)
Age2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Wave 2 0.02 0.00 0.07*** 0.06***
(0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009)
Wave 3 0.04 0.02 0.11*** 0.08***
(0.026) (0.019) (0.019) (0.016)
Wave 4 0.05 0.03 0.13*** 0.11***
(0.036) (0.028) (0.028) (0.023)
Wave 5 0.06 0.04 0.13*** 0.11***
(0.048) (0.037) (0.037) (0.030)
Wave 6 0.01 0.00 0.10** 0.08**
(0.058) (0.045) (0.046) (0.036)
Wave 7 0.01** 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.00***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Observations 395,354 395,354 395,354 395,354
R-Squared 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03
Number of id 35,715 35,715 35,715 35,715
Rho 0.863 0.751 0.822 0.815
Sigma 1.736 0.959 1.065 0.847
Source: UKHLS 2009–2017. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Note: U is a binary measure for workers experiencing an unemployment spell and identifies the treatment group.






/esr/advance-article/doi/10.1093/esr/jcaa065/6050316 by Bibliotheque C
antonale et U
niversitaire user on 28 D
ecem
ber 2020
Table A2. Post-matching fixed-effects panel regressions on log income, Switzerland 1999–2017






T2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
T0 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
T1 0.00 0.02** 0.00 0.00
(0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
T2 0.00 0.02** 0.01 0.01*
(0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
T2*U 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01
(0.030) (0.023) (0.026) (0.020)
T0*U 0.22*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.06**
(0.036) (0.025) (0.027) (0.022)
T1*U 0.30*** 0.16*** 0.21*** 0.10***
(0.047) (0.034) (0.032) (0.024)
T2*U 0.16*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.08***
(0.050) (0.039) (0.035) (0.029)
Age 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.06***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013)
Age2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Years 2001–2002 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02
(0.022) (0.020) (0.018) (0.017)
Years 2003–2004 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.02
(0.034) (0.029) (0.027) (0.024)
Years 2005–2006 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.01
(0.041) (0.039) (0.035) (0.031)
Years 2007–2008 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.04
(0.053) (0.050) (0.043) (0.038)
Years 2009–2010 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.04
(0.064) (0.059) (0.051) (0.045)
Years 2011–2012 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.05
(0.074) (0.068) (0.056) (0.051)
Years 2013–2014 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.03
(0.087) (0.077) (0.061) (0.058)
Years 2015–2016 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.01
(0.098) (0.087) (0.073) (0.067)
Observations 48,363 48,363 48,363 48,363
R-Squared 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.04
Number of id 4,564 4,564 4,564 4,564
Rho 0.809 0.815 0.713 0.722
Sigma 0.910 0.884 0.644 0.626
Source: SHP 1999–2017. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Note: U is a binary measure for workers experiencing an unemployment spell and identifies the treatment group.
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